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Fortune Favors the Prepared? τύχη in The History of the
Peloponnesian War
Liam O’Toole ’20
Given how frequently Thucydides references τύχη
(tuchè) in his History of the Peloponnesian War, it is clear that
the concept, however he may define it, is essential for
comprehending his narration of the war between Sparta and
Athens. What, then, does Thucydides mean by τύχη? Are the
most common translations of “luck,” “chance,” or “fortune”
sufficient? Not so. After exploring different passages in which
it plays a vital role, it is evident that Thucydides understands
τύχη in a complex fashion. In this paper, I will examine a
small subset of the passages in which τύχη appears in order to
try to strike at the heart of Thucydides’ intent when employing
this loaded word. Critically, τύχη does not often appear in
isolation. In fact, Thucydides, in part, formulates his
understanding of τύχη in relation to two other abstract ideas:
παρα λογον (“contrary to expectation”) and γνωμη
(“knowledge,” “opinion”). Through exploring the relationship
between τύχη and these other ideas, it becomes easier to see
how Thucydides thinks. This paper will explore Thucydides’
multilayered understanding of τύχη and its role in the outcome
of the Peloponnesian War and human events more generally.
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Thucydides was neither the first Greek historian, nor
the first Greek author, to employ τύχη as an explanatory tool.
In their works, most ancient Greek authors often brought τύχη
into the equation when they were unable to explain an event
as the result of human action. Others, like Hesiod, saw Τύχη
as a divine force, a literal goddess born from Thetis and
Okeanos1. Thucydides largely followed the former tradition.
This becomes clear through the words of the Athenian orator
Pericles in his first speech in The History of the Peloponnesian
War. Therein, he speaks to the Athenian (and Thucydidean)
notion of τύχη as an explanation for the inexplicable. He states
that, “‘The movement of events is often as wayward and
incomprehensible as the course of human thought; and this is
why we ascribe to chance whatever is contrary to
expectation'” (‘ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων
οὐχ ἧσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου: δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ,
εἰώθαμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι’ 1.140.1). Here is the first instance that
Thucydides connects τύχη to events that are παρα λογον, or
“contrary to expectation.” In this use, τύχη becomes the
“ready-made scapegoat for the inexplicable events of
history.”2 This is not the only time that Thucydides proves to
use τύχη in this way. Section 2.85.2, for instance, describes

1
2

Hesiod, Theogony, 336-370; Sorensen (2014), 26
Sorensen (2014), 26
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the aftermath of the naval battle of Naupactus where the
Spartans suffer a loss Thucydides terms “ὁ παράλογος.”3 The
reason this loss was unexpected was because the Spartans had
the superior number of ships going into the fight. Stunned, the
Spartan generals attempt to boost their soldiers’ confidence
before the next battle by claiming that this disastrous result
came about because “‘fortune was in many ways unpropitious
to us’” (‘ξυνέβη δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης οὐκ ὀλίγα
ἐναντιωθῆναι’ 2.87.2).

By blaming τύχη, the Spartan

generals make the same “scape goat” association between
τύχη and παρα λογον as Pericles.
By far the greatest example of Thucydides’ impulse
to connect events that happen παρα λογον to τύχη comes in
the Pylos episode in Book 4. At one point during the fighting,
the Athenians find themselves warding off the Spartans, who
are attacking by sea, from Laconian land. Thucydides draws
attention to this occurrence primarily because the Spartans
“particularly prided themselves on being a land power
supreme in infantry” while the Athenians were “seafarers who
excelled in fighting with ships” (ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐποίει τῆς δόξης
ἐν τῷ τότε τοῖς μὲν ἠπειρώταις μάλιστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ πεζὰ
κρατίστοις, τοῖς δὲ θαλασσίοις τε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ πλεῖστον
προύχειν 4.12.3). Although not explicitly defined as παρα
λογον, this situation was clearly unexpected and contrary to
3

Thucydides 2.85.2
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expectation. What brought about this unusual situation?
Thucydides claims that it was τύχη alone: “Fortune brought it
round into this state” (ἐς τοῦτό τε περιέστη ἡ τύχη 4.12.3).
This is not the only time that τύχη comes into play
during the Pylos episode. Indeed, τύχη is a factor from the
moment a storm “happens” to force the Athenian troops to
land at Pylos in the first place.4 τύχη later benefits the
Athenians when they trap the Spartans on the nearby island of
Sphakteria, for an accidental fire clears the forest and allows
the Athenian general Demosthenes to make a bold attack.5
Demosthenes and the Athenians then surround the Spartans
and force them to surrender. Such an outcome was entirely
unexpected, leading Thucydides to describe the Pylos episode
as “the biggest event contrary to expectation of the Greeks
during the war” (παρὰ γνώμην τε δὴ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸν
πόλεμον τοῦτο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο 4.40.1). While he uses
παρὰ γνώμην (“contrary to opinion”) in place of παρα λογον
(“contrary to expectation”), the sense is the same. Considering
their unexpected conclusion, it is unsurprising that
Thucydides works so hard to demonstrate the critical role that
τύχη played the Pylos episode.
4

“While they were objecting, it happened that a storm came up and
forced them into Pylos (ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ κατὰ τύχην χειμὼν ἐπιγενόμενος
κατήνεγκε τὰς ναῦς ἐς τὴν Πύλον 4.3.1)
5
“One of them accidently set fire to a small part of the woods, and after
this a wind came up, most of the woods burned down before they knew it”
(ἐμπρήσαντός τινος κατὰ μικρὸν τῆς ὕλης ἄκοντος καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου
πνεύματος ἐπιγενομένου τὸ πολὺ αὐτῆς ἔλαθε κατακαυθέν 4.30.2)

98

That he uses it to explain events that he cannot
otherwise explain does not begin to encompass the entirety of
Thucydides’ conception of τύχη. Despite its seemingly
inextricable link to the inexplicable, Thucydides’ idea of τύχη
still lies within the realm of human control—to a degree, that
is. Specifically, Thucydides contrasts the idea of τύχη with
words denoting preparation/skill (γνωμη, παρασκυη, τεχνη) in
several episodes of his work in order to demonstrate that τύχη
is a force that can be controlled, but only with the proper tools.
Pericles gives credence to this idea when he tells his soldiers,
“‘Maritime skill is like skill of other kinds, not a thing to be
cultivated by the way or at chance times’” (‘τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸν
τέχνης ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὅταν τύχῃ,
ἐκ παρέργου μελετᾶσθαι’ 1.142.9). Pericles here directly
contrasts τύχῃ (“chance”) with τέχνη (“skill”). That is, success
cannot and will not come by simply trusting in τύχῃ. Later in
his speech, Pericles goes further, reminding the Athenians
how their ancestors came to power: “‘Not by good fortune but
by wisdom, and not by power but by courage, they drove the
Barbarian away and raised us to our present height of
greatness’” (‘γνώμῃ τε πλέονι ἢ τύχῃ καὶ τόλμῃ μείζονι ἢ
δυνάμει τόν τε βάρβαρον ἀπεώσαντο καὶ ἐς τάδε προήγαγον
αὐτά’ 1.144.4).

Although τέχνη has become γνώμη

(“wisdom”), the idea that skill and preparation are to be
trusted more than τύχη remains the same.
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Through the previously discussed naval battle of
Naupactus, Thucydides provides further indication that skill
can override τύχη. While the Spartan generals attribute their
loss here mainly to τύχη, they also note that “they lacked
preparation” for any type of sea battle (τῇ τε γὰρ παρασκευῇ
ἐνδεὴς ἐγένετο 2.87.2). This battle, then, is a perfect
illustration of what Pericles earlier stated: there will be no
opportunity for good fortune without proper preparation and
skill. Thucydides pointedly makes no mention of τύχη in his
narration of the battle. Rather, he makes sure to note how the
Athenian general Phormio makes a careful plan to wait for
wind to break up the Spartan naval formation.6 In crafting a
plan rather than relying on chance, Phormio makes use of all
three ideas contrary to τύχη by trusting in his knowledge and
his navy’s preparation and skill. Phormio does not wait for
τύχη to come his way, but rather makes his own “luck.” This
maneuver embodies what Thucydides has been striving to
portray by contrasting τύχη with these different ideas. He
shows that while τύχη itself might be out of human control,
the outcome of events its effects are not. Phormio and Pericles
both show that while τύχη is not “a force...that we can
control,” it nonetheless “can be countered with preparation
and experience.”7

6
7

Thucydides 2.84.2-3
Heilke (2004), 134
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Why must τύχη be countered in the first place? In
Thucydides’ interpretation, τύχη is not always a benevolent
good. In fact, it is most often a dangerous psychological
construct. When something unexpected happens, both those
whom it benefits and those whom it harms perceive it as the
result of τύχη. Soon after, the idea of τύχη invades the minds
of both the victor and the vanquished. Each side begins to buy
into the idea that what happened was out of their control; the
losers genuinely believe they can never win again while the
winners perceive themselves to be invincible. The Athenian
general Diodotus, in his speech advocating against sacking the
Mytilenians, first articulates such a psychological conception
of τύχη. He claims that trusting in ἐλπὶς (“hope”) gives the
impression that τύχη is on your side.8 This is only a problem,
however, because τύχη, “induces states as well as individuals
to run into peril, however inadequate their means” (ἀδοκήτως
γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε παρισταμένη καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων
κινδυνεύειν τινὰ προάγει, 3.45.6). Through Diodotus,
Thucydides begins to demonstrate his understanding of τύχη
as not simply an imaginary force, but rather as a dangerous
mindset. Because “perceptions or descriptions of events as
lucky or unlucky motivate deeds in turn,” Thucydides’
8

“Desire and hope are in all things, the former leading, the latter urging it
on, the former devising the plan, the latter suggesting fortune will be kind”
(ἥ τε ἐλπὶς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ μὲν ἡγούμενος, ἡ δ᾽ ἐφεπομένη, καὶ ὁ
μὲν τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν ἐκφροντίζων, ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα
3.45.5)
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believes that it is one’s belief in τύχη that causes events, not
τύχη itself.9
The Spartan reaction to the Pylos episode leads to a
further clarification on the psychological effects of τύχη.
After losing the battle, the Spartans send ambassadors to the
Athenians in hopes of reaching a peace settlement. In their
talks, the Spartans bring up the ever-changing nature of τύχη.
Using themselves as a prime example, they warn the
Athenians that “‘You should not suppose that, because your
city and your empire are powerful at this moment, you will
always have fortune on your side’” (‘οὐκ εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς διὰ τὴν
παροῦσαν νῦν ῥώμην πόλεώς τε καὶ τῶν προσγεγενημένων
καὶ τὸ τῆς τύχης οἴεσθαι αἰεὶ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἔσεσθαι’ 4.18.3). τύχη
is not a one-and-done experience to the Spartans or
Thucydides. It must be constantly acquired and directed,
earned through human γνώμη. To become complacent and to
trust that one instance of τύχη will lead to others can cause a
drop-off in the preparation and forethought necessary to
control τύχη in the first place. More dangerously, it can lead
to a corresponding increase in confidence, often to the point
of arrogance that the Spartans warn against here.
Of course, the Athenians do not listen to their enemies
instead letting τύχη get into their heads. At the close of the
Pylos episode, Thucydides notes that even as the Spartans
9

Schillinger, 16
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continued to send ambassadors to release those captured on
Sphakteria, “the Athenians only raised their terms” (οἱ δὲ
μειζόνων τε ὠρέγοντο 4.41.4). Clearly, they were already
beginning to trust in their present τύχῃ. This arrogance comes
back to bite the Athenians a few chapters later, when the
Sicilians make peace so the Athenians will not attack.
Thucydides writes that the Athenians did not expect things to
go this way. Indeed, they had fully expected to conquer Sicily,
“for in their present prosperity they were indignant at the idea
of a reverse; they expected to accomplish everything, possible
or impossible, with any force, great or small” (οὕτω τῇ [τε]
παρούσῃ εὐτυχίᾳ χρώμενοι ἠξίουν σφίσι μηδὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ τὰ ἀπορώτερα μεγάλῃ τε
ὁμοίως καὶ ἐνδεεστέρᾳ παρασκευῇ κατεργάζεσθαι 4.65.4). It
is clear that the Athenian perception of their own capabilities
had already become inflated. This inflated ego comes to a
head in the disastrous defeat that results from the Sicilian
expedition. As one scholar notes, “Athens' actions from Pylos
through to Sicily” illustrates “the pattern of good fortune
leading to υβρις and resulting in downfall.”
Naturally, there are two sides to the psychological
construct of fortune—both equally dangerous. In the
aftermath of Pylos, the Spartans experience the psychological
effect of τύχη opposite to their opponents: they “wallow in
fear of bad luck.” In its disheartening effect, τύχη is just as

103

malignant as in its confidence-boosting impact. At Cythera,
soon after their defeat at Pylos, Thucydides writes that “
Never in their [Spartan] history had they shown so much
hesitation in their military movements” ( ἔς τε τὰ πολεμικά,
εἴπερ ποτέ, μάλιστα δὴ ὀκνηρότεροι ἐγένοντο 4.55.2 ).What
caused such a change in the Spartan mindset? τύχη, of course:
“Fortune too was against them, and they were panic-stricken
by the many startling reverses which had befallen them within
so short a time” (καὶ ἅμα τὰ τῆς τύχης πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ
ξυμβάντα

παρὰ

λόγον

αὐτοῖς

ἔκπληξιν

μεγίστην

παρεῖχε”4.55.13). τύχη puts the Spartans in a negative
headspace that they are not able to overcome until their
victory at the Battle of Mantinea. Thucydides states that by
winning that battle, the Spartans cleared themselves of their
previous mindset and now found themselves finally to be out
of the grasp of fortune: “they, although reproached because of
fortune, seemed to be the same as before in character (τύχῃ
μέν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, κακιζόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ὄντες
5.75.3). For Thucydides, τύχη, “can cause extreme moods of
despair and dissent or elation and over-confidence depending
on circumstance.” To remedy the vitriolic nature of τύχη, of
course, Thucydides would recommend γνωμη.
In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides
aimed to present the most clear and accurate depiction of the
events of the various campaigns, a pursuit which undoubtedly
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made its many unexpected and inexplicable events frustrating.
Fortunately, he had the “catch-all” word τύχη at his disposal.
Throughout his own narration and the speeches of his
characters (whose words are, in large part, his own),
Thucydides uses τύχη in a much more nuanced way than
Greek authors and historians before him. τύχη is neither a
scapegoat nor some divine being by whose will human actions
are determined. Rather, Thucydides’ τύχη is a powerful force,
a psychological construct even, that can still be countered—
primarily with γνωμη. In The History of the Peloponnesian
War, even when τύχη is present, Thucydides consistently
attempts to show how “human actions and natural causes [are]
the underlying explanations of the outcome.” Ultimately, this
work demonstrates that fortune favors those who do not rely
on its assistance.
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